We consider a discrete time Markov Decision Process with in nite horizon. The criterion to be maximized is the sum of a number of standard discounted rewards, each with a di erent discount factor. Situations in which such criteria arise include modeling investments, production, modeling projects of di erent durations and systems with multiple criteria, and some axiomatic formulations of multi-attribute preference theory. We show that for this criterion for some positive there need not exist an -optimal (randomized) stationary strategy, even when the state and action sets are nite. However, -optimal Markov (non-randomized) strategies and optimal Markov strategies exist under weak conditions. We exhibit -optimal Markov strategies which are stationary from some time onward. When both state and action spaces are nite, there exists an optimal Markov strategy with this property. We provide an explicit algorithm for the computation of such strategies and give a description of the set of optimal strategies.
The use of a discounted reward criterion in Markov decision models is consistent with the notion that what happens far in the future is unimportant. Discounted future cost can be given the economic interpretation of an opportunity cost. It can also arise through the subjective notion that immediate rewards are better than delayed rewards. Existing theory deals with the following three situations: the case of a xed discount rate (Shapley 1953 , Blackwell 1962 , 1965 , Denardo 1967 , Bertsekas 1987 , Dynkin and Yushkevich 1979 , Heyman and Sobel 1984 , Ross 1984 , Whittle 1982 , the case when the discount rate depends on current states and actions (Sch al 1975) , and the case when the discount rate is a function of the history of the process (Hinderer 1970) . Naturally, results in the last situation are very limited, and no e ective computational procedures are available.
Discount factors depend on perceived investment opportunities. When there are several different investment opportunities then it is natural to consider a weighted discounted criterion. This criterion is the sum of several expected total discounted rewards with di erent discount factors. Such criteria arise in models of investments with di erent risk classes. Two cash ow streams with di erent risks would have di erent required rates of return and hence di erent discount rates. Nevertheless, the value of the portfolio consisting of both cash ow streams would be the sum of their individual values, a principle appropriately named value additivity; Brealey and Myers (1988) . Thus, the value of the portfolio is the sum of the discounted values of each cash ow stream in the portfolio.
Weighted discounted criteria also arise naturally in production. Standard models of production costs involve a component which decreases exponentially, due to the e ect of learning: the \learning curve" is a model of costs which decrease as a result of improved technology and know-how. The rate involved in learning is not related to the discount rate arising from the opportunity cost. Thus the natural model could involve one discount factor arising from the opportunity cost, and one additional (di erent) discount factor for each technological area which a ects production. Since the ultimate objective involves total costs, a weighted discounted criterion arises.
Weighted discounted criteria also arise in the axiomatic formulation of multi-attribute preference theory. Sobel (1991) describes general preference axioms leading to discounted and weighted discounted criteria.
Other examples when weighted discounted criteria arise in economics include investments in di erent assets within a company, investments in di erent pension funds, management of state budgets, and investment opportunities in a country with a prevalent underground economy.
Another possible interpretation of total discounted rewards is the sum of total rewards in models with nite but random horizon; Ross (1984) . If the model re ects the managing of long-term and short-term projects in parallel, weighted discounted criteria arise.
Weighted discounted criteria arise also in models with multiple criteria when each criterion is an expected total discounted reward and di erent criteria may have di erent discount factors. Linear-weighted averages (Keeney and Rai a 1976) for such models are weighted discounted criteria. A related approach to this multiple criteria problem, via constrained optimization, is discussed in Feinberg and Shwartz (1992) .
Various weighted criteria were considered by Feinberg (1982b) as an illustration of possible applications of methods developed in that paper. The case of a weighted sum of two criteria was considered by Filar and Vrieze (1989) in the context of stochastic games. They consider the nite model and obtain existence of -optimal Markov strategies for the sum of two criteria; one being the a total discounted cost, and the other either the discounted or the average reward per unit time. When the rst criterion is a total discounted cost and the second one is average reward per unit time, the weighted Markov decision problem was considered by Krass, Filar, and Sinha (1990) for discrete time models and by Ghosh and Marcus (1991) for continuous time models. Models with average reward per unit time may be described through discounted models with discount factors close to 1; see Blackwell (1962) , Veinott (1966) , Denardo (1971) . Thus, our model covers the management of projects with long and short durations. By considering di erent discount factors we can optimize not only interactions of two projects, long and short, but more generally model interactions of several projects with di erent durations.
We present a theory for the weighted discounted criteria, which is de ned more precisely in (1.1){(1.2) below. In Section I we describe the model and the problems under investigation, and show that even the simplest weighted problem may not possess the structural properties of the standard discounted problem. In particular, even for nite state and action spaces there may not exist a stationary (non-randomized) optimal strategy; in fact, there may not exist an -optimal randomized stationary strategy! Moreover, randomized stationary strategies perform strictly better then (nonrandomized) stationary strategies, and the best stationary (and randomized stationary) strategies may depend on the initial state. In these examples, the optimal strategy turns out to be stationary only after some initial time. In Sections II{III we show that this is generic.
In Section II we prove the existence of -optimal and optimal Markov strategies. We also establish the existence of -optimal strategies which are Markov and are stationary from some time N onward: we call strategies of this form (N; 1)-stationary. In Section III we consider models with nite state and action sets. For this model we show that there exist optimal strategies of this form and provide an explicit algorithm to compute an optimal (N; 1)-stationary strategy.
This algorithm is of the same level of complexity as the computation of optimal strategies for the standard discounted reward problem. We also give a description of the set of optimal strategies for models with nite state and action sets.
I. De nitions and examples.
Consider a discrete-time controlled Markov chain with (i) countable state space X, (ii) measurable action space A endowed with a -eld A containing all one-point subsets of A, (iii) sets of actions A(x) available at x 2 X. These sets are assumed to be elements of A; (iv) transition probabilities fp(y j x; a)g. For each x; y 2 X the function p(y j x; a) is nonnegative and measurable in a; and P y2X p(y j x; a) = 1 for each x 2 X and a 2 A(x).
Let H n = X (A X) n be the space of histories up to the time n = 0; 1; : : :; 1. Let 
H n be the space of all nite histories. The spaces H n and H are endowed with -elds generated by 2 X and A. A strategy is a function that assigns to each history h n = x 0 a 0 x 1 : : :x n?1 a n?1 x n 2 H n ; n = 0; 1; : : :; a probability measure ( j h n ) on (A; A) satisfying the following conditions: (a) (A(x n ) j h n ) = 1; (b) for any B 2 A the function (B j ) is measurable on H.
A Markov strategy is a sequence of mappings n : X ! A; n = 0; 1; : : :; such that n (x) 2 A(x) for any x 2 X. We say that a Markov strategy is (N; 1)-stationary, where N = 0; 1; : : :, if n (x) = N (x) for any n = N + 1; N + 2; : : : and for any x 2 X. A (0; 1)-stationary strategy is called stationary. A stationary strategy is determined by a function : X ! A such that (x) 2 A(x); x 2 X. We will also consider randomized stationary and randomized Markov strategies. A randomized stationary strategy is de ned by conditional distributions ( j x); x 2 X; over (A; A) such that (A(x) j x) = 1 for any x 2 X. A randomized Markov strategy is de ned by conditional distributions n ( j x); n = 0; 1; : : :; x 2 X; over (A; A) such that n (A(x) j x) = 1 for all n and x:
Using standard notation and construction, each strategy and initial state x induce a probability measure IP x on H 1 . We denote the corresponding expectation operator by IE x . In contrast with traditional models, we also have (v) a collection of one-step rewards fr k (x; a); k = 1; 2; : : :; Kg which are assumed bounded above and measurable in a, and (vi) a collection of discount factors f k ; k = 1; 2; : : :; Kg; where 0 < k < 1 for any k = 1; 2; : : :K.
The discounted reward associated with the one-step reward r k and discount factor k when the initial state is x and strategy is used is given by V k (x; ) = IE x 1 X t=0 ( k ) t r k (x t ; a t ) :
(1:1)
The weighted discounted reward when the initial state is x and strategy is used is now de ned as
(1:2)
The value of this problem is given by V (x) = sup V (x; ):
(1:3) Let be a nonnegative constant. A strategy is called -optimal if, for all x, V (x; ) V (x) ? :
(1:4) A 0-optimal strategy is called optimal.
We remark that an important practical motivation of this paper is to analyze a situation when a controller pursues a goal to satisfy short| and long-term interests simultaneously. In this situation, it is natural to consider a linear combination of total discounted and average per unit time rewards; cf. Krass, Filar, and Sinha (1990) . However, from a mathematical viewpoint, this criterion is awkward; even for models satisfying the strongest possible ergodic conditions and with nite state and action sets, optimal strategies may not exist; cf. example 3.1 in Krass, Filar, and Sinha (1990) and are adopted in the interest of simplifying the notation.
In section II we establish the existence of -optimal Markov (Theorem 2.1), -optimal (N; 1)-stationary (Theorem 2.4), and optimal Markov (Theorems 2.2, 2.6) strategies for this criterion. In section III we establish the existence of optimal (N; 1)-stationary strategies for models with nite state and action sets and describe an e ective algorithm for the computation of these strategies.
However, some interesting features of the weighted average criterion are displayed in the following examples.
Example 1.1. For all > 0 small enough, there exists no -optimal randomized stationary strategy for a model with nite state and action sets. Moreover, the best strategy among the randomized stationary ones is indeed randomized.
Consider the model with X = fx; yg and A = fa; bg. Let p(x j z; a) = 1 = p(y j z; b); z = x; y :
We will take the simplest case where K = 2; r 1 = r 2 = r, and r(x; a) = 1; r(y; a) = r(x; b) = 0; r(y; b) = 2: (1:6) Denote V (x; ; ) = V (x; ). It is intuitively clear that V (x; ; 0) V (x; ; ) for any in 0; 1], since b is optimal at y, and this for all and . This can also be seen more formally, as follows.
From (1.6) we obtain after some algebra Therefore, given the initial state x and 1 = 1 5 ; 2 = 3 5 , the randomized stationary strategy is best among all randomized stationary strategies.
De ne the strategy f by f n = 8 < : V (x; g 00 ) = 3:5:
We conclude that, for < 3:9 ? 3:76795 there does not exist an -optimal randomized stationary strategy, and that the best randomized stationary strategy is strictly better than the best stationary (non-randomized) strategy.
Remark 1.2. Example 1.1 can be modi ed so that the decision process is ergodic (i.e. the process is an ergodic Markov chain under all stationary strategies). Since the reward is continuous in the transition probabilities, the conclusions will continue to hold under such a small change. Thus the source of the non-stationarity is indeed the structure of the criterion.
If the state and action spaces are nite, then so is the number of stationary strategies. Therefore, for any given initial state there is a best stationary strategy. Example 1.3 shows that, in contrast to standard discounted (or average) problems, the best stationary strategy may depend on the initial state. Example 1.3. Consider the model from Example 1.1, but with an additional state s, A(s) = fag and p(x j s; a) = 1. We let r 1 (s; a) = r 2 (s; a) = 0 and, as in Example 1.1, we set 1 = 1
Since the set of actions at s is a singleton, we retain the same notation for stationary strategies as in Example 1.1. As shown in Example 1.1, the stationary strategy g 0 is the only stationary strategy which is best for both initial states x and y. However, V (s; g 0 ) = Therefore, V (s; g 00 ) > V (s; g 0 ) and we conclude that the best stationary strategy depends on the initial state. Direct computation along the lines of Example 1.1 shows that the best randomized stationary strategy also depends on the initial state.
Note that the optimization of this model starting at state s is equivalent to the optimization of the model starting at x, but with the reward functions changed from r 1 and r 2 to 1 r 1 and 2 r 2 .
II. The structure of optimal strategies.
We establish the existence of optimal Markov strategies by embedding our model into a standard stationary discounted Markov decision process. Consider the Markov decision process with state space X IN; where IN = f0; 1; : : :g: Denote the generic state variable byx = (x; t). The action space remains unchanged, and the set of action available at statex = (x; t) is A(x). The new transition probabilities are de ned througĥ p((y; t 0 ) j (x; t); a) = 8 < :
p(y j x; a); if t 0 = t + 1, 0;
otherwise.
It is easy to check that conditions (i){(iv) of xI hold for the new model. It is also clear that for any strategy of the original model there corresponds a strategy^ in the extended model, which is uniquely speci ed for (extended) histories such thatx 0 = (x; 0). Now assume without loss of generality that the discount factors are ordered so that 1 > 2 > : : : > K . Under assumption (v) we can write the reward (1.1){(1.2) as V (x; ) = IE x Theorem 2.1. For any > 0 there exists an -optimal Markov strategy for the weighted discounted
Proof. Given > 0; a stationary -optimal strategy exists for a discounted Markov decision model, if the one-step reward function is bounded above; see Dynkin and Yushkevich (1979) . Since the reward functions r k are bounded above, the one-step reward function r in the extended model (2.1)
is bounded above on X IN A. For a given > 0, let^ be a stationary -optimal strategy for the extended model. By our construction, this strategy corresponds to a (non-stationary) Markov strategy for the original model through n (x) =^ (x; n) : Proof. Recall that in our model, all functions r k are bounded above. There exist -optimal stationary strategies for discounted problems with rewards bounded above; see Dynkin and Yushkevich (1979) . Therefore, we shall consider the case K > 1. Suppose that the functions r 1 ; : : :; r m?1 ; r m+1 ; : : :; r K are bounded, with 1 m K. We x some > 0. Let be a stationary strategy such that is ( =4)-optimal for the criterion V m . Let be a Markov ( =4)-optimal strategy for the weighted problem. Proof. The following result holds for a nonstationary Markov decision model with total expected rewards, when a value function is nite (Feinberg 1982a, Theorem 3) . Given an initial distribution, for any strategy there exists a Markov strategy with greater or equal total expected rewards. If the state space is nite or countable, one may consider an initial distribution such that for any x 2 X the probability that x is an initial state is positive. Thus, if is an optimal strategy then there exists a Markov strategy which is not worse than , and hence is optimal as well. Therefore, if for a nonstationary Markov decision model there exist an optimal strategy then there exists an optimal Markov strategy. Consider now the weighted discounted problem. The existence of an optimal strategy for the original model implies the existence of an optimal strategy for the extended model. Therefore, for the extended model there exists an optimal Markov strategy^ : The Markov strategy de ned by n (x) =^ n (x; n) is optimal for the weighted discounted model. III. The structure of optimal strategies in nite models. In this section we consider a nite model ( nite state and action spaces). As in xII we assume without loss of generality that 1 > 2 : : : > K . For a nite model, there always exists a stationary optimal strategy for the standard discounted problem, and it is optimal if and only if it solves the optimality equation (see e.g. Bertsekas 1987 , Dynkin and Yushkevich 1979 , Heyman and Sobel 1984 , Ross 1984 . By Corollary 2.3 there exists an optimal Markov strategy for the weighted problem.
Consider now the discounted problem associated with r k and k . Let V k (x) denote the optimal (maximal) value of the discounted problem with this reward and discount factor, and let V ? k (x) denote the minimal value, attained over all strategies. Let ? 1 (x) denote the set of conserving actions of the discounted problem with reward r 1 and discount 1 at state x, that is Lemma 3.1. V 1 (x; ) = V 1 (x) for some x 2 X if and only if a t 2 ? 1 (x t ) (IP x -a.s.) for all t = 0; 1; : : : :
Proof. For a randomized Markov strategy ; the lemma follows from the optimality equation and the thrifty and equalizing properties; cf. Hordijk (1974) , van der Wal (1991) , van der Wal and Wessels (1984) . Let be an arbitrary strategy and let an initial sate x be xed. The lemma by Derman-Strauch-Veinott (Derman 1970 , Section 7, Theorem 1, and van der Wal 1981, Lemma 2.1) constructs a randomized Markov strategy such that all two-dimensional distributions of (x t ; a t ) under the strategies and coincide for all t = 0; 1; : : : : This result and the correctness of Lemma 3.1 for randomized Markov strategies imply Lemma 3.1.
For a strategy 2 and a historyh n = x 0 a 0 x 1 : : :x n a n 2 (X A) n+1 , n = 0; 1; : : :; we de ne the shifted strategyh n as the strategy which uses, in response to a history h 0 m = x 0 0 a 0 0 : : :x 0 m ; the action that would use at epoch (n+m); if the historyh n h 0 m = x 0 a 0 : : :x n a n x 0 0 a 0 0 : : :x 0 m is observed.
Namely,h n = if for any m = 0; 1; : : :; and for any history h 0 m = x 0 0 a 0 0 : : :x 0 m 2 (X A) m X, we have ( jh 0 m ) = ( jh n h 0 m ). We also de neh ?1 = ; and ; = .
A strategy is called persistently optimal, if for anyh n 2 (X A) n+1 , n = 0; 1; : : :; the strategyh n is optimal; cf. Dubins and Sudderth (1977), Feinberg (1986) .
Lemma 3.1 implies the following result.
Corollary 3.2. A policy is persistently optimal for criterion V 1 if and only if (? 1 (x n )jh n ) = 1 for any h n = x 0 a 0 : : :x n 2 H n ; n = 0; 1; : : : : Let X 1 = fx 2 X; A(x) 6 = ? 1 (x)g and 1 = To prove (3.2) by contradiction we de ne a (non-randomized) strategy through (x 0 a 0 : : :x n ) = 8 < : (x n ); if n t and x t = z; (x n ); otherwise.
If (3.2) does not hold then V (x; ) > V (x; ). This contradicts the optimality of . Therefore, inequality (3.2) is proved.
For a Markov strategy = ( 0 ; 1 ; : : :) we consider the shifted strategies n = ( n ; n+1 ; : : :); n = 0; 1; : : :. We can rewrite (3.2) in the following way
To continue the proof by contradiction we assume that for some x and z in X there exists some t N 1 such that t (z) = 2 ? 1 (z), with IP x (x t = z) > 0: Let be a stationary strategy such that (y) 2 ? 1 (y); for any y 2 X. By Lemma 3.1, V 1 (y; ) = V 1 (y); y 2 X:
We have nally
where the rst inequality follows from the de nition of N 1 ; the second one follows from the de nitions of the value functions, and the third one follows from (3.3) and (3.4).
On the other hand, Corollary 3.4. Let X and A be nite. There exists a Markov optimal strategy such that t (x) 2 ? 1 (x) for any x 2 X and for any t N 1 . Proof. Let be an optimal Markov strategy. If t N 1 and IP y fx t = xg > 0 for some x; y 2 X; then t (x) 2 ? 1 (x) in view of Lemma 3.3. We consider a Markov strategy such that t (x) = t (x) if IP y fx t = xg > 0 for some y 2 X and t (x) 2 ? 1 (x) if IP y fx t = xg = 0 for any y 2 X. Then t ( ) 2 ? 1 ( ) when t N = N 1 . Since IP y = IP y for any y 2 X; the strategy is optimal.
If ? 1 (x) is a singleton for each x 2 X; then Corollaries 2.3 and 3.4 imply that there is an optimal (N; 1)-optimal strategy such that t (x) = ? 1 (x); for any x 2 X; and for any t N 1 . Optimal actions t (x); x 2 X may be found as a solution of N 1 -step dynamic programming model with state space X; action space A(x); x 2 X; transition probabilities p; one-step rewardsr If ? 1 (x) is not a singleton for some x 2 X then, as Corollary 3.4 states, the action sets A(x t ) for t N 1 may be actually reduced to ? 1 (x t ). Moreover, by Lemma 3.1, for any strategy using actions from sets ? 1 ( ); one has V 1 (x; ) = V 1 (x); x 2 X. Therefore, the expected rewards for criterion V 1 from epoch N 1 to 1 are the same for any Markov strategy such that t (x) 2 ? 1 (x) for any t N 1 and for any x 2 X. Thus, if our goal is to construct an optimal strategy from moment N 1 onward, then we have reduced the problem with K reward functions r 1 ; r 2 ; : : :; r K to the problem with K ? 1 reward functions r 2 ; : : :; r K .
Fix k = 2; 3; : : :; K. We denote ? 0 ( ) = A( ): For l = k; k + 1; : : :; K let V (kl) denote the value function for the discounted problem with state space X; action sets ? k?1 (x); x 2 X; rewards r l , transition probabilities p and discount factor l . Let V (kl) ? denote the minimal value for the respective minimization problem and let ? k (x), x 2 X; be the sets of conserving actions for the maximization problem: We denote ?(x) = ? K (x); x 2 X:
We say that a strategy is lexicographically optimal at x 2 X if the vector (V 1 (x; ); : : :; V K (x; )) is lexicographically greater than or equal to the vector (V 1 (x; ); : : :; V K (x; )) for any strategy (in the lexicographical ordering: that is, V l (x; ) > V l (x; ) implies V i (x; ) < V i (x; ) for some i < l.) A strategy is called lexicographically persistently optimal ifh is lexicographically optimal at x for any x 2 X and anyh 2 1 n=0 (X A) n : Lemma 3.5. A policy is lexicographically optimal at x if and only if a t 2 ?(x t ) (IP x -a.s.) for any t = 0; 1; : : : : Lemma 3.6. A policy is lexicographically persistently optimal if and only if (?(x n )jh n ) = 1 for all h n = x 0 a 0 : : :x n 2 H n ; n = 0; 1; : : : : Proof. Lemma 3.5 follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.5 follows from Corollary 3.2.
De ne X k = fx 2 X; ? k?1 (x) 6 = ? k (x)g and We are now ready to state an algorithm for the computation of optimal strategies.
Algorithm 3.7. Theorem 3.8. If the state and action spaces are nite, then there exists an (N; 1)-stationary optimal strategy for the weighted problem, with N < 1. Algorithm 3.7 nds such a strategy.
The stationary strategy N which an optimal strategy uses when the time parameter is greater than or equal to N ( N = ; see Algorithm 3.7) coincides with a stationary strategy which is lexicographically optimal for the problem with discounted criteria V 1 ; V 2 ; : : :; V K :
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.3 iteratively at most K times. After the kth iteration, k = 1; : : :; K?1;
we replace the original model by the model that starts at moment N k : This means that the initial rewards r j ; j = 1; : : :; K; are replaces by ( j ) N k r j : Lemma 3.3 allows us to reduce the action sets to ? k ( ) after the kth iteration. Since for the kth new model the criteria V 1 ; : : :; V k are insensitive to strategies, we can replace r j by 0 when j = 1; : : :; k: After a nite number of iterations we have from Lemma 3.3 that the stationary strategy de ned in step 3 of Algorithm 3.7 describes some optimal strategy from time N onward, where N is the last value of N k in the algorithm.
Any solution of a nite stage dynamic programming problem described in step 5 of Algorithm 3.7
provides an optimal strategy at moments 0; : : :; N ? 1:
We note that Q x2X
?(x); where the sets ?( ) are computed in Algorithm 3.7, is the set of lexicographically optimal stationary strategies for the problem with discounted criteria V 1 ; : : :; V K :
Remark 3.9. The computational complexity of solving the nite weighted discounted problem is of the same order of magnitude as that of solving a standard discounted problem. We need to solve a sequence of such problems, but at each step the size of the action space decreases. Finally, we need to solve a nite problem, whose size depends on the ratios of the discount factors (through N).
Remark 3.10. In order to compute N k we need to compute V (kl) and V (kl) ? for l = k; k +1; : : :; K.
Note that these need to be recomputed at every stage since the action set changes at every stage.
This requires the solution of 2(K ? k) discounted problems at stage k. To avoid this computation, one may replace V (kl) ? by a lower bound R (kl) =(1 ? l ), where R (kl) = inffr l (x; a); x 2 X; a 2 ? k?1 (x)g; k = 1; 2; : : :; K, l = k + 1; : : :; K: Similarly, V (kl) may be replaced by the upper bound R (kl) =(1 ? l ); where R (kl) = supfr l (x; a); x 2 X; a 2 ? k?1 (x)g; k = 1; 2; : : :; K; l = k + 1; : : :; K:
But the computation of V (kk) cannot be avoided, if the algorithm reaches step 1 with this k: This results in a considerable reduction in the complexity of computing N k . However, this cruder estimate will lead to a larger nal value for N, and hence increase the complexity of the nite problem in step 5 of Algorithm 3.7. It is also possible to use V (kl) as upper bounds of V (ml) and V (kl) ? as lower bounds of V (ml) ? ; k < m; in order to reduce the number of discounted dynamic programming problems that should be solved at step 1 of the algorithm.
The next two lemmas characterize the optimal policies for the nite-time part of the problem Lemma 3.11. A strategy is optimal for the criterion W with an initial state x 2 X if and only if a t 2 A(x t ) (IP x -a.s.) for any t = 0; : : :; N ? 1: Lemma 3.12. A strategy is persistently optimal for the criterion W if and only if (A t (x n )jh n ) = 1 for any h n = x 0 a 0 : : :x n 2 H n ; and any n = 0; : : :; N ? 1: Proof. If is a randomized Markov policy, Lemma 3.12 is the principle of optimality. This and the lemma by Derman-Strauch-Veinott (cf. the proof of Lemma 3.1) imply Lemma 3.12. Lemma 3.11 follows from Lemma 3.12. where the number N and the stationary strategy are computed in Algorithm 3.7. We consider the sets A n (x); n = 0; : : :; N ? 1; de ned by (3.6){(3.10) and the sets ?(x); x 2 X:
The following two theorems provide a description of the set of optimal strategies.
Theorem 3.13. Let X and A be nite. One has V (x; ) = V (x) for a strategy and initial state x 2 X if and only if a t 2 A t (x t ) (IP x -a.s.) for all t = 0; : : :; N ? 1 and a t 2 ?(x t ) (IP x -a.s.) for all t N:
Theorem 3.14. Let X and A be nite. A policy is persistently optimal for the weighted total discounted criterion if and only (A n (x n )jh n ) = 1 for n = 0; : : :; N ? 1 and (?(x n )jh n ) = 1 for n N for any h n = x 0 a 0 : : :x n 2 H n :
Proof. Theorem 3.13 follows from Lemma 3.5, Theorem 3.8, and Lemma 3.11. Theorem 3.14 follows from Lemma 3.6, Theorem 3.8, and Lemma 3.12.
Remark 3.15. The existence result of Theorem 3.4 holds when the number of discount factors and reward functions is countable, provided two conditions hold:
(i) 1 > 1 > 2 > : : :;
(ii) P 1 k=1 jr k (x; a)j < 1 for all x and a:
Since the state and action spaces are nite, ? k (x) = ? k+1 (x) for all k large enough and all x: If the sets ? k (x) become singletons for all x after a nite number of steps, then the algorithm will identify the optimal strategy within a nite number of steps. Therefore, there is no N < 1 such that there exists a stationary (N; 1)-optimal policy.
